

Exhibit 1

Incident Update

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INCIDENT NAME: HIGHWAY 78 (WITCH CREEK) FIRE
INCIDENT DATE/TIME: October 21, 2007
LOCATION: SANTA YSABEL AT HWY 78
REPORT DATE/TIME: 2:15 p.m.

Update:

The Sheriff is issuing an advisory evacuation for San Diego Country Estates in Ramona.

The evacuation point is Poway High School located at 15500 Espola Road.

The county is posting fire updates for the public at www.sdcountyemergency.com. Residents should call 2-1-1 for all non-emergency calls related to this fire. If the call is initiated from a cell phone, 2-1-1 can be reached at 858-300-1211.

Exhibit 2

October 21, 2007

11 p.m. News Conference Re: Fire

NBC 7/39 Newscast

Susan Taylor:

... they've been practicing for this basically since the Cedar Fires. They do mock emergency drills around the City to see... they have been doing mock emergencies to deal with mass casualties from all sorts of emergencies and now all of the things they have learned have ...

Mayor Sanders:

With me this evening is 5th District Councilmember Brian Maienschein, Fire Chief Tracy Jarman, and Executive Assistant Chief of Police Bill Mahe. There's a high potential that the Witch Fire may enter our City limits in the early morning hours between 1 and 2 a.m. on Monday through the San Pasqual Valley and that's in the far northeastern part of the City of San Diego. This potential will depend on the velocity of the winds, and the efforts of firefighters to fight back this fire. This is a very quickly evolving situation. In an abundance of caution, we want San Diegans to be aware of this potential now so that they can take appropriate actions and collect important belongings so that when evacuations are necessary they can evacuate immediately. Residents in the area of Highway 78 and Bandy Canyon are now under a mandatory evacuation order. In order to ensure that residents in the area are advised of this emergency, San Pasqual Valley residents will be receiving a reverse-9-1-1 call from the City of San Diego advising them of mandatory evacuations. If a police officer visits your home, please listen to what they have to tell you. When they tell you you need to evacuate, please

evacuate immediately. Listen to them, take the directions that they have and leave the area as quickly as possible.

I want all of our citizens to know that our fire department will do everything in their power to contain the fire and safeguard their belongings. In the meantime, please do your part by evacuating if you are asked to do so.

The City of San Diego has activated the CAPS line: 619-570-1070 and they'll have all information about evacuation centers, areas that need to be evacuated, they can answer questions that you have.

Please, if you're asked to evacuate, evacuate immediately and leave the area so the firefighters and police officers can do their job.

Right now I have Councilmember Maienshein, Fire Chief Tracy Jarman, and Executive Assistant Chief of Police Bill Mahe.

**Councilmember
Maienshein:**

Thank you, Mayor. And tonight as we begin the mandatory evacuation of the San Pasqual Valley, we expect that there will be fire entering the valley sometime in the early morning hours. We ask that people please leave in an orderly fashion. There isn't a need to panic. We've evacuated large communities before and done it because the people have not had to panic, and so I would urge that, Number 1. Number 2, we would ask people to not be looky-loos and come into the area to look at the progression of the fire. It's important that we be able to get our law enforcement personnel and our fire personnel in and out in

an orderly fashion. If you see law enforcement there asking you to leave, please leave immediately.

If there's some good news about this portion of the City and this portion of my Council District, is that there's a lot of greenery there and so we're hoping that this will slow down the progression of this fire and give us more time to ensure that we get everybody out and at the same time get all our law enforcement and fire personnel in.

So to those people of that community, please continue to do what they've done all along during the course of today, cooperate, help one another and let's make sure that we can get out of this as quickly and easily as possible and with that I know that Chief Jarman will have some more information. There are fire strike teams already out in the valley and I know she's going to add more to that. So, Chief Jarman.

Chief Jarman:

Good evening. As you can see the wind is still blowing. It's very strong and it's causing the fire to move quicker than we had anticipated, but I have got to assure you that we have all been coordinating since early this morning. This is Calfires' fire. They are the incident commander. Poway, Escondido, City of San Diego, Lakeside, we're all working together.

The Witch Fire has basically broken into two separate fires, two heads of the fire. One head of the fire is headed towards San Pasqual, the other head of the fire has headed towards what we're calling 52 and south of Poway. Right now we're focused on the San Pasqual area and to ensure

people get evacuated from the area of Highway 78 and Bandy Canyon Road.

We've pre-positioned some strike teams out in the area, San Pasqual Academy, Fire Station 52 in Poway and Fire Station 42 in the Sabre Springs area, just to ensure that we're set to go, whatever comes our way. We're watching the progress of the fire as challenging; it's hard to have aircraft up when you have this type of wind. But we did get Copter 1 up to take an aerial surveillance and we're awaiting information back from them as we speak. So if I could ask all of the citizens out there to proceed cautiously, calmly and we'll get through this just like we always have in the past. We'll do the best we can.

We've ordered a hundred strike teams from out of the area, brush engines and fifty strike teams for structure protection, but it just depends on how soon those resources can get here. Meanwhile, we've staffed up every engine that we have in the City of San Diego and we're doing the best we can to keep you safe and get the information out through the media, so thank you. Turning it over to Assistant Chief, Bill Mahe.

Assistant Chief Mahe:

Thank you Tracy. What I'd like to do is update everybody on the evacuation locations in the areas that are being evacuated. Since early this afternoon, law enforcement and firefighters from throughout the County and multiple agencies have been using both 9-1-1...Reverse 9-1-1 systems as well as door-to-door notifications to ask for evacuations and I implore anyone who is getting those notifications, to evacuate as quickly as possible to the areas

that are designated. As of right now, what we know is that all Ramona is under evacuation. All residents are under a mandatory evacuation in the Ramona area and authorities are notifying up to the 10,000 residents that live there. Evacuees can go from Ramona to Mira Mesa High School. The Poway High School location that was previously identified has been closed down and we're moving...expanding into the Mira Mesa High School area. All schools in the Ramona Unified School District will be closed tomorrow.

The American Red Cross has set up the following three shelters as temporary evacuation points for residents in paths of both fires: for residents in the east county affected by the Harris Fire, shelters are located at Steele Canyon High School, which is 12440 Campo Road in Spring Valley, that's Thomas Brothers Map Page 1272 B-7 and the Campo Community Center at 976 Sheridan Road in Campo. Approximately 200 shelter residents were served dinner at Steele Canyon and people have continued to arrive since early this afternoon. The Campo Center reports a handful of residents at the time of...just a few minutes ago. For residents in the Santa Ysabel and Ramona areas affected by the Witch Creek/Highway 78 Fire, a shelter is open at Mira Mesa High School. That was the one that was previously located at Poway High School. Approximately 80 evacuees as of a few minutes ago are staying at that shelter. Three facilities will remain open as long as there is a need...or these, excuse me, these facilities will remain open as long as there is a need. Residents will be provided a place safe to stay, drinks and meals at all of these locations. Residents with large animals are instructed to

take them to Lakeside Rodeo grounds located at Highway 67 and Maplevue Street or the San Diego Fairgrounds at Del Mar. Residents are urged to place their household pets in carriers and crates, and bring pets supplies if you would to help, and leashes as well to keep them under control. Bring all the necessary daily medications and as you evacuate your households, please make sure you obtain the necessary medications for yourself as well as your pets and animals.

The Red Cross advises all residents as well as law enforcement and firefighters, please heed the evacuation notifications. For updated information, you can call either 211 or the CAPS line, the Citizens Access Phone System, which is 619-570-1070, that's 619-570-1070. And just one more update on the schools that are closed that we know about at this point in time, all schools in the Ramona Unified School District will be closed; all schools in the Poway Unified School District will be closed tomorrow, and that's what we know of right now. Thank you very much.

Unknown:

. . . . Can you clarify for us the two areas in which the Witch Creek Fire is. . . ?(Could not hear rest of question)

Chief Jarman:

Okay. Actually, the south flank of the Witch Fire is 52 and south of Poway, near the Sycamore Canyon area. It's not moving as fast as the area in the San Pasqual area at this time.

Unknown:

(Could not hear question)

Chief Jarman:

Actually that's coming through Calfire. We requested it from northern California, up above the Malibu fire and the other fires that are going on. I know that the Witch Creek Fire is the Number 1 concern for the state of California as we speak. So the resources are headed this way, we just don't know what time they will get here.

Unknown:

What about Scripps Ranch....(Could not hear questions)

Chief Jarman:

Right now, Scripps Ranch should be fine, but they can watch the news. We'll try to use the media to get the word out when evacuations need to take place. We need it to be orderly. If everybody tries to evacuate at the same time, we're going to clog our freeways. So, right now, we're trying to get everybody out of San Pasqual/Ramona area and we'll go from there. We'll keep you updated as we go through the night.

Unknown:

(Could not hear question)

Chief Jarman:

Exactly. Thank you.

Unknown:

Any other questions? Thank you all very much.

Exhibit 3

Exhibit 4

List of Homes Destroyed in Rancho Bernardo

****This list was compiled by the Office of Councilmember Brian Maienschein and is not an official listing of all structures lost. We will continue to update this list as more information becomes available.**

Aceituna Street.

18494
18525
18607
18647
18667
18687
18707
18736
18787

Agreste:

11691

Aguacate Way:

17867
17887

Aguamiel:

18028
17998
17988
17978
17967
17968
17961
17960
17952
17955
17946
17947
17942
17938
17941
17913
17905
17881
17873
17865

Address not visible house across from 17850 & next to 17849

17841
17838
17825
17814
Address not visible across from 17808 & next to 17803
17794
17786
17778

Aguamarina Pt.
13033

Agusto Way
12929
12938
12949
12958
Between 12938 & 12958
12968
12969
12988

Alcade:
11476
11460

Aliento:
11486
11463
11462
11454
11457
11512
11513
11523
11533
11552

Almendo:
18078 (significant damage)
18068 (significant damage)

Andanza:
11656
11666
11676

Augustus Place

Address not visible btwn 12714 & 12723

Ave. Cordilla

18675

Azofar

18425

18435

Azucar:

17808

17816

17824

17849

Address not visible house btwn 17849 & 17865

17865

17885

17864 (Extensive Damage)

Bedfordshire Court:

12613

Bellechase Circle:

17776

17782

17788

17792

17796

Bernardo Trails Court

18375

18455

18490

Bernardo Trails Drive:

18684

18735

18808

18829

18839

Bravata Court

18829

18828

18808
12888 (Partial)

Cabela Place
11449

Cabela Drive:
18013
No address visible btwn 18013 & 17995
17995
17987
17961
17943

Calle Estapona
18064
18054

Caminito Ramillette
13145
13140
13130
12899

Canfield Place:
18278
18298
18295
18275

Capilla:
11279 (partial)

Chetenham Lane:
12580
12532

Chieftan:
18185

Chretien:
18161
18169
18189
18197

Cloudsly Drive:

12464
12515
12523
12524
12535 partial
12546
12554
12566
12571
12572
12579
12595 (partial)

Cmto Pasadero:

18791 #73
18721 #150 & 148

Collonades:

18167
18175
18183

Corazon:

17947
17948
17927
17898
17897
17877
17878
17858
17857
17837
17838
17818
17808

Corte de Aceitunos

18175
18181
18187

Creciente Way:

17716
17777

17787

Creciente Court:

11323

Danza Circle:

11517

No address visible btwn 11527 & 11534

11534

11524

Duenda:

11419

11448 (partial)

11458

Address not visible next to 11449 & across from 11458

11464

11468

11469

11478

11479

11510

Escoba:

11479

11534

Haden Hall Court:

18255

Hampshire Lane:

18379

Ipai Court:

11072

Jocatel:

11686

11666

Lancashire:

18520

18539

18551

18545

18560

18576

Address not visible btwn 18560 & 18576

18584

18587 (partial)

18617

18635

18641

18647

18653

18673

18683

Address not visible btwn 18673 & 18683

18690

18682

Address not visible btwn 18682 & 18666

18658

18650

18642

18634

18626

Address not visible btwn 18618 & 18602

18564

18576

Address not visible btwn 18576 & 18560

18560

Address not visible btwn 18275 & 18258

Lincolnshire Street:

18344

18336

18328

Locksley Street:

18588

18580

Address not visible btwn 18627 & 18611

18643

18642

18667

18683

18689

18697

18682

18666

18658

Lunada Place

12898

12850

12841

12808

Lunada Point

18718

Luz Place:

11373

11363

11353

Address not visible to left of 11372

Luz Road:

11430

11420

Mirasol Drive:

18070

Matinal Drive:

17616

17608

Moon Song:

18285

Olmeda Court

Between 13014 & 13023

Olmeda Place

18708

18707

Pajaro:

11389

Palito Court:

11536

11485(partial)

11539

11529

11519

Address not visible to the right of 11534

Address not visible across from 11479

Poblado Road:

*Some units burned in La Terraza – unable to confirm units.

Polvera Ave

12929
12939
12944
12958
13164
12986
13084
13184
13103
13104
13113
13123
13013
13023
13034
13044
13054
13053

Polvera Court

12913
12923
12943
12942
12922 (Partial)

Polvera Drive

18670
18690
18705
18710

Polvera Way

18025
18055

Pueblo Vista:

17893

Robleda Court:

18608

18687

Robleda Cove:

12958 (partial)

Sencillo:

18121

18111

Shopshire Lane:

Address not visible between 12587 & 12559

Sun Maiden:

18187

18181

Tetagnier:

12095

Valladares:

17616

17605

17635

17788

17848

18188

18198

18187

18177

18167

18157

18147

Address not visible to left of 18107

Via Terifa

18034

Voisin Court:

11964

Weaving Lane:

17783

Wessex Street:

18666

18674

18515

18523

Exhibit 5

Mitigation Strategies for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks



San Diego County Wildland Fire Task Force
Findings and Recommendations

Report to the Board of Supervisors
August 13, 2003

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On August 13, 2002 (27), at the request of Supervisor Dianne Jacob, the County of San Diego, Board of Supervisors, directed staff to assemble a team of specialists to develop a comprehensive plan for managing wildland vegetation to reduce the severity of wildfires and decrease their impact on residents. Representatives from 24 agencies and organizations have met over the last year, conducting an in-depth analysis of wildland fire issues and developing a comprehensive wildland fire mitigation plan.

① The Task Force researched the history and complexities of wildland fires, including weather, topography, fuel (vegetation), multiplicity of owners/managers, wildland-urban interface, and the diseases and pests that can destroy trees weakened by drought. The Task Force members formed subcommittees to analyze major areas of concern and develop wildland fire mitigation recommendations in each area.

The Vegetation Management Subcommittee developed six recommendations regarding annual evaluations of fire risks, defensible space, weed abatement/fuel modification ordinances, grant funding, wildland fire rapid response teams and low cost insurance for prescribed burning.

The Codes and Ordinances Subcommittee developed five recommendations regarding property setbacks, venting and glazing requirements for new construction, weed abatement issues, fire hazards and review of regulatory compliance on County-owned, operated or controlled properties.

The Bark Beetle Management Subcommittee developed two

recommendations regarding grant funding for removal of dead and dying trees and establishing priorities for such tree removal efforts.

The Public Education Subcommittee developed four recommendations for education efforts regarding forest health, risks and responsibilities of those living in the wildland-urban interface, defensible space and reactivation of a UC cooperative extension position dedicated to wildland fuel management and education.

INTRODUCTION TO THE WILDLAND FIRE TASK FORCE

The San Diego County Wildland Fire Task Force was formed following the Pines Fire of July/August 2002 to address the continuing wildland fire problem facing the residents of San Diego County. The Pines Fire near Julian was the third largest fire in the County's history, consuming 61,690 acres, destroying 45 structures and damaging 121 structures. It cost an estimated \$22.6 million to extinguish.

Following the Pines Fire, the County Board of Supervisors directed staff to assemble a team of specialists from federal, state, and local agencies to develop a comprehensive plan for managing wildland vegetation to reduce the severity of wildfires and decrease their impact on county residents. Topics of specific review included establishing and maintaining firebreaks, performing prescribed burns, clearing hazardous brush, and organizing a "bug crew" to develop a plan to deal with problems associated with the County's bark beetle infestation.

On September 3, 2002, the Department of Agriculture, Weights and Measures sent a letter inviting various agencies and community groups to a meeting on September 18, 2002. A broad base of expertise was recruited including representatives from local, state and federal agencies, as well as members of local environmental groups. Representatives from 24 agencies and organizations attended that initial meeting to provide diverse expertise for an in-depth analysis of wildland fire issues and for the development of a comprehensive wildland fire mitigation plan. (A list of participating agencies and

other stakeholders can be found in Attachment II, and a list of the meetings held is provided in Attachment III.)

Due to the complexities of the issues and the large number of participants, Task Force members divided into subcommittees to develop a full spectrum of strategies that could be used to reduce wildland fire risks in the unincorporated area.

Vegetation Management – Investigate methods of vegetation management including fuel breaks, prescribed burning, mechanical clearing, biological brush control, and chemical brush control.

Codes and Ordinances – Review the existing codes relating to wildfires including building codes and vegetation clearance requirements around structures located in wildland-urban interface areas.

Bark Beetle Management – Investigate methods for bark beetle eradication or control.

Public Education – Expand strategies to educate the public on the essential steps for and the benefits of reducing fire risks.

This report of wildland fire issues and mitigation recommendations is generated from meetings held by the full Task Force, subcommittee meetings, and research of the scientific literature regarding the various issues addressed. A glossary of fire-related terms used in this report is provided in Attachment I. A bibliography of the resources utilized in the Task Force's research is shown in Attachment IV.




Figure 4.

Topography

Topography, or the “lay of the land,” greatly influences fire intensity and the direction of spread. Fires generally spread much faster up hill because convective heat rises, preheating the vegetation ahead. Aspect, or the direction that a slope faces, determines the type and moisture content of the vegetation. South facing slopes are drier and consequently have lighter vegetation than north facing slopes. Therefore, southerly exposures generally burn faster but with less intensity. Canyons and saddles funnel winds, increasing wind speed and consequently increasing fire spread. Consequently, homes built in steep, narrow canyons and at canyon rims face an increased risk from fires.

Fuel

Dr. Jon Keeley, mentioned above, argues that fires are wind driven events and more frequent smaller fires are not ecologically necessary. However, the preponderance of evidence favors fuel as the limiting factor.

Studies conducted by Dr. Richard Minnich of UC Riverside and Dr. Thomas Bonnikson of Texas A&M conclude that fires in pre-European times were more frequent, less intense, and generally burned during the summer. They concluded that the age of fuel was the limiting factor in fire spread.

The vegetation in San Diego County’s fire prone area is primarily chaparral with some coniferous forests and oak woodlands. These vegetation types are fire-adapted, that is, they have evolved with fire and require fire to maintain healthy, functioning ecosystems.

During the last century, greater emphasis was placed on fire prevention, and professional firefighting forces continued to improve fire suppression methods. One side effect of those efforts was that the average age of wildland vegetation increased, and as it aged, it became increasingly dense. Recent studies indicate that southern California forests currently have three to ten times the vegetation density that existed 100 years ago. The increase in fuel density adds to the problem of controlling fires because more fuel results in more intense wildfires.

Recently burned chaparral and trees will not carry fire for five years post fire. From six to 20 years, these fuels can burn during extreme weather conditions. From 21 to 50 years these fuels will burn well under normal summer and fall conditions, making strong uphill afternoon runs but generally slowing down at night, allowing fire crews to gain control. After 50 years, the amount of dead branches and shrubs exceeds 50% of the available fuel, resulting in very hot fires, extreme fire behavior, long range "spotting" (throwing off embers ahead of the fire) and increased resistance to control. Add Santa Ana conditions to old fuel and the result is the classic southern California firestorm.

At UCLA, two mathematicians (Peng and Schoenburg) analyzed the Los Angeles Malibu fire regime from a statistical and physics perspective. They were aware of the debate over fuel-driven fires versus wind-driven fires and they concluded that, statistically, fuel was the limiting factor. Their illustration below provides a dramatic illustration of the difference between a landscape shaped with almost no fire suppression activity in Baja California compared to San Diego County's landscape, where highly efficient fire suppression forces are employed. Fires in Mexico rarely

exceed 10,000 acres although fire starts are abundant. (See Figure 5.)




Figure 5. Map comparing fire size of San Diego County and Baja California 1971 (utilizing the most recent comparative data available).

Frequent smaller fires result in a mosaic of differing aged vegetation, so fires become somewhat self-limiting. San Diego's huge areas of aged fuel, on the other hand, can lead to vast acreages burning in a single summertime event like the 61,690 acre Pines Fire of 2002 or the 62,000 acre Conejos Fire of 1950. Santa Ana winds and old fuel can result in conflagrations like the record-setting 190,000 acre Laguna/Boulder Fire of 1970.

Presently, almost one-half of the vegetation in San Diego County's wildland is over 50 years old. Another 30% is over 20 years old. This means that almost 80% of the wildland areas in San Diego will burn

explosively under typical periods of high fire danger. (See Figures 6 and 7.)

San Diego County Fuel Age Classes		
Age	Wildland Acres	Percent of Wildland Acres
0-20 years	290,508	21.54%
21-50 years	413,113	30.63%
51+ years	645,009	47.83%
Total	1,348,630	100.00%

Figure 6.

Wildland Management Responsibility

One of the significant complexities of wildland management is the multiplicity of owners and land managers. Because land management responsibilities are divided between these groups, effective public

education and ongoing interagency coordination are critical for effective fire mitigation efforts countywide.




Figure 7. Vegetation older than 50 years.

The chart below shows responsible parties and the number of wildland acres with 50+ year-old vegetation under their control. (See Figure 8.)

Ownership of land with fuels over 50 years old*			
OWNERSHIP	ACRES	SQ MILES	PERCENT
Private	246,592	384.56	38.23%
U.S. Forest Service	122,205	190.86	18.95%
Tribal Lands	73,213	114.39	11.35%
California Department of Parks and Recreation	66,856	104.46	10.37%
Bureau of Land Management	65,508	102.34	10.16%
Water Districts	26,188	40.78	4.06%
Cities	12,214	18.93	1.89%
Military Reservations (Camp Pendleton, Miramar)	12,242	19.11	1.90%
County Parks and Open Space	12,106	18.84	1.88%
State	4,775	7.46	0.74%
State (CalTrans)	1,126	1.66	0.17%
California Department of Fish and Game	931	1.46	0.14%
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service	331	0.52	0.05%
Other	720	1.02	0.11%
Totals	645,009	1006.41	100.00%

Figure 8. * Based on the most recent GIS layer.

The set of four maps below shows the geographic distribution of wildlands with fuel over 50 years old in San Diego County by responsible land manager. (See Figure 9.)




Figure 9. Wildlands with fuel over 50 years old.

Wildland-Urban Interface

The addition of hundreds of new houses each year to “wildland-urban interface” areas adds to the complexity of wildland fire mitigation. These structures may limit the ability of fire managers to pick the most effective location to stop wildland fires and may require firefighters to limit perimeter control activities in order to concentrate on defending homes. The situation is further complicated when homeowners have not maintained an area of reduced vegetation around their homes. This “defensible space”

around structures allows firefighters a safe place to operate under the extreme fire conditions that accompany many recent wildfires.

Flammable roofing material is perhaps the most significant factor in the loss of homes in wildland-urban interface fires. Shingles not only catch fire easily, they break free and sail upward to be deposited as fire-starting embers downwind. Conclusions below regarding major factors in wildland-urban fires put flammable roofing material at the top of the lists. Fortunately, building

VEGETATION MANAGEMENT

This subcommittee agreed that fuel or vegetation management is probably the single most effective tool available to mitigate fires. Prescribed burning, chemical treatment, mechanical treatment, biological treatment, fuel breaks, and defensible space around structures are all forms of vegetation management.

Methods of Reducing Vegetation

Prescribed Burning

Prescribed burning is the intentional introduction of fire, under favorable weather and fuel conditions, in order to remove old vegetation (fire fuel). Some experts believe that prescribed burns, set under carefully monitored conditions, can safely remove old fuel and present a barrier to the spread of wildfire while minimizing erosion potential and improving habitat. However, other experts believe that any man-imposed action upon wildlands is unnecessary and possibly detrimental.

Proponents of prescribed burning observe that in areas with more frequent fires, especially forests and woodlands, vegetation tends to consist of fewer but larger trees, enhancing drought survival capabilities. In addition, some studies have shown that more frequent, smaller, and less intense fires favor animal populations by increasing plant and habitat diversity.

The U.S. Forest Service has successfully conducted prescribed burns on lands north of Pine Valley and on the eastern slopes of

Palomar Mountain. However, private landowners sometimes are reluctant to allow projects on their lands due to liability concerns. Therefore, some large beneficial projects are halted because one landowner refuses permission to allow his/her land to be burned.

Currently, in San Diego County, all land management agencies annually perform prescribed burns on less than 3,000 acres total. Proponents estimate 27,000 acres annually would be needed to have a significant impact on the fire situation.

Chemical Treatments

Herbicides have been successfully used to convert some chaparral-covered areas to grasslands and to reduce the understory vegetation load in forests. They may have some use in maintaining clearance around structures and in reducing the cost of maintaining fuel breaks. Herbicides can provide advantageous affects when applied to cut brush stumps to maintain clearance around structures. However, the policies of many land management agencies preclude pesticide use in quantities large enough to have any significant impact on the overall fuel problem.

Mechanical Treatment

Mechanical methods of vegetation management include bulldozing, crushing, chaining, large brush crushers, other specialized devices, and hand clearing. Many of these methods rely on burning the crushed brush in the winter during periods of damp weather. Hand cutting or "chipping," with the chips being reapplied to the site, is feasible for small areas but

One of the lessons learned from the pilot program is to prioritize the limited chipper availability based on risk factors. Local fire districts or the local wildland agency would be better positioned to set community priorities for chipping services.

Options for future chipping programs include:

- Purchasing chippers with grant funds for individual fire districts or community-based groups. Issues of operator training and liability would need to be addressed if the machine were not operated by district personnel.
- Using grant funds to contract with private companies to provide community “chipper days.” Days would be scheduled, community groups and members notified, and residents would cut and stack for chipping ahead of time.
- Developing and implementing a system of partial cost sharing, with residents paying a portion or all of the costs. Government would provide the service directly or with contracted help, charging on a cost recovery basis. Economies of scale would allow efficient use of resources, reducing costs to residents. Reduced costs may encourage residents to maintain their vegetation in a fire-safe manner.
- Some combination of all of the above could be implemented. San Diego County is diverse geographically and biologically. One method that would work in a mountain community may not be successful in an inland valley community.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1. At the end of each fire season, evaluate the status of fire risks for San Diego County, and as appropriate, prepare a status report of mitigation efforts accomplished in the prior year for the Board of Supervisors.

Recommendation 2. Continue to enforce legal requirements for defensible space (fuel modification zones) around structures.

Recommendation 3. Develop model weed abatement and fuel modification ordinances for existing structures located in wildland areas.


Recommendation 4. Continue to seek grant funds for chipping while exploring the various cost-saving chipping program options listed above.

Recommendation 5. Research options for providing low cost insurance to cover landowners who allow prescribed burning on their lands.

Recommendation 6. If wildland fire damages personal property, continue to assist residents whose property has been damaged or destroyed by providing a rapid response multi-departmental damage assessment team.

Exhibit 6

THE 2003 SAN DIEGO COUNTY FIRE SIEGE FIRE SAFETY REVIEW



I. Purpose

In late October of 2003, three major fires burned in San Diego County. Between October 25th and October 27th, 16 people lost their lives; 3241 structures¹ were destroyed, and suppression costs topped \$43,000,000. The Cedar fire alone, at 273,246 acres, was the largest fire in California history.

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, the Regional Forester, Pacific Southwest Region, United States Forest Service, and the Forest Supervisor, Cleveland National Forest authorized an interagency team of wildland fire experts to conduct a review of the management of the Cedar, Paradise, and Otay fires.

The following report was researched and written in mid-November through December 2003. Information for this assessment was derived from over 121 interviews with firefighters and support personnel from the Otay, Paradise, and Cedar fires, and incident documentation and reports, photos, maps, and other references.

This report documents issues, findings and recommendations from a stakeholder workshop held on November 20, 2003. The workshop was conducted to provide an interactive forum for all agencies and groups that took part in response actions related to the San Diego County incidents. Participants included personnel from city, County, State and Federal firefighting agencies, law enforcement personnel, CALTRANS, FEMA, and the United State Marine Corps. Discussions focused on interagency relationships, communications, aviation and ground safety, preparedness, community protection, and wildland fire resource issues. Discussion groups focused on what worked well within these areas, needed improvements, and recommendations for the future. Full documentation of the workshop may be found in Appendix A.

¹ This figure represents all structures including primary residences, commercial structures, and outbuildings.

- Joint Public Information
- Mobilization Guide
- Training
- Wildland Fire Response

E. Environmental, biological and social conditions which may have contributed to the severity and effects of the fires, as well as those which may have prevented / mitigated fire's effects.

"Adding to the complexity of the wildland fire problem are the many subdivisions, individual homes, and recreational developments located in the hills and mountains. People build homes there because it is more attractive than living in large urban areas. Unfortunately, despite recent efforts by State and local governments to impose fire safety regulations on such home sites, wildland residents rarely prepare for the inferno that can sweep through volatile brush and timber and destroy their homes in minutes"- Excerpt, "Recommendations To Solve California's Wildland Fire Problem", Task Force on California's Wildland Fire Problem, 1972.

Summary

The overall environmental and biological factors that contributed to the 2003 San Diego County fires are easily identified: long-term drought, dry, extremely windy conditions and the accumulation of dense, drought and insect-killed fuels in open spaces and undeveloped areas adjacent to urban development.


Discussion and analysis of wildland-urban interface fire events must include investigation of social factors that influenced the final outcomes of the incidents. It is critical to assess the level to which the community and government recognized, acknowledged, and prepared for the event of wildfire. This includes consideration of urban development patterns, construction types, and level of awareness and preparation on the part of residents and local, Federal and State governments. In some areas, lack of appropriate planning and preparation contributed to poor outcomes. In other cases, social factors played a key role in limiting fire-related damage and saving lives.

Social conditions contributing to the fire's effects are not as easily summarized. Residential developments in San Diego's wildland-urban areas are generally rather high in density. Newer developments reflect contemporary building codes, and are constructed with less flammable materials such as tile roofs and fire resistant sidings. Older developments and homes in rural areas were built in accordance with older, less stringent codes, and are not generally as resistant to fire, although some homes have been retrofitted with fire-resistant materials.

There is a comprehensive awareness of the threat (and historic regular occurrence) of wildfires on the part of residents and local officials. However, fire-related considerations have not been well integrated into community planning,

Exhibit 7

SAN DIEGO REGIONAL FIRE PREVENTION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TASK FORCE



Submitted To:

**Mayor Dick Murphy
Supervisor Greg Cox
October 7, 2004**


**Sheriff Bill Kolender, San Diego County Sheriff's Department
Fire Chief Jeff Bowman, San Diego Fire-Rescue Department**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Mission

The San Diego Regional Fire Prevention and Emergency Preparedness Task Force was established by City of San Diego Mayor Dick Murphy and Chairman of the San Diego County Board of Supervisors, Greg Cox on November 12, 2003. The Task Force was established to provide a forum for representatives of all public safety disciplines to review, discuss and develop proposals for all risk service enhancements in the San Diego region.

Background




In October of 2003, San Diego County experienced the most devastating wildland/urban interface fire disaster in the history of our region. The level of damage and loss resulting from the October 2003 firestorms was previously unimaginable: 383,269 total acres burned; 2,453 homes, 22 commercial properties, 763 outbuildings destroyed; and 16 lives were lost, including one firefighter.

To assist the region in establishing an action-oriented plan or initiative process to help avert future catastrophes associated with all risk hazards, Mayor Dick Murphy and Supervisor Greg Cox established the San Diego Regional Fire Prevention and Emergency Preparedness Task Force. Fire and law enforcement professionals, community officials and local representatives were members of the Task Force. The Task Force was directed to conduct meetings and report its findings and recommendations 180 days after the first meeting.

Summary of Task Force Meetings

All Task Force meetings were held in the City of San Diego at the Sheriff's Department Headquarters. The initial meeting was conducted on December 16, 2003. The Task Force members were welcomed by Mayor Dick Murphy and County Supervisor Greg Cox and were provided a general overview of Task Force membership, mission and time lines, goals and staff support. Three primary goals were established with 20 subcommittees and chairpersons identified.



The second meeting was conducted on January 29, 2004. Subcommittee reports were presented by the assigned chairpersons. Subcommittee report formats were discussed and agreed upon to ensure a level of standardization in report structure. Other issues were discussed including a recommendation that the existing Countywide Media Work Group be tasked with the responsibility to review and improve the Joint Information Center process. The second supplemental issue discussed was the concept of an emergency survival program for the proactive approach to educating the public.

ISSUE 3A

Review Inconsistencies, Changes to, and Enforcement of Countywide Building/Fire Codes

Issue 3B

Review and Recommend Changes to and Enforcement of Countywide Urban Interface With Brush Management Codes

Issue 3C


Review and Recommend Changes to Open Space Brush Management Policies

Issues 3A, B and C were grouped into a Fire/Building Code task group.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE

Since the first wildland/urban interface fire destroyed 584 homes in Berkeley in 1923, California has lost well over 16,000 residential structures and hundreds of lives to similar fires. Suffering a disproportionate share of California's life and structure loss is San Diego County, which accounts for 20%. Past studies have shown that with proper vegetation clearance and building construction, over 95% of structures threatened by wildland/urban interface fires would survive unharmed. Yet most cities in San Diego County do not have fire and building codes to address these issues, and the codes in the County and fire districts are not uniformly enforced.

BACKGROUND DISCUSSION



The October 2003 Southern California fires burned over 739,587 acres, destroying 3,631 homes, 36 commercial properties, and 1,169 outbuildings. Even worse, 246 people were injured and 24 were killed, including one firefighter. The majority of these losses occurred in San Diego County. After the fires, the San Diego Regional Fire Prevention Emergency Preparedness Task Force was formed by the City and County of San Diego to determine what can be done to prevent such losses in the future.

The Task Force was given three goals, which were then divided into tasks. While achieving each of the goals will make the region better prepared for future wildland fires, we believe that enactment and enforcement of consistent fire and building codes that address wildland/urban interface issues will provide the greatest benefit in creating a fire-safe environment in San Diego County. It is critical that structures are designed and constructed so that they will survive the flammable environment in which they are placed.




Exhibit 8



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Saturday, October 27, 2007

Last modified Wednesday, November 5, 2003 10:50 PM PST

County supervisors chastised over fires

By: GIG CONAUGHTON - Staff Writer

SAN DIEGO ---- County supervisors voted unanimously Wednesday to use \$3 million in county reserves to help victims of last week's devastating fires and to look into creating a fleet of firefighting helicopters.

The board's meeting, however, became heated when a prominent attorney chastised supervisors for not doing enough to prevent future fires.

Supervisors also voted unanimously to petition Gov.-elect Arnold Schwarzenegger to form an independent investigation ---- apart from the Blue-Ribbon investigative panel created by Gov. Gray Davis ---- into the start of the four fires that scorched more than 400,000 acres and destroyed more than 2,400 homes countywide.

Addressing supervisors as they prepared to vote to transfer the \$3 million from reserves to the Office of Emergency Services, attorney Michael Aguirre said that the supervisors knew the county's backcountry was an overgrown, dying tinderbox of vegetation waiting to "burn explosively" ---- a problem outlined by the county's Wildland Fires Task Force in July.

Aguirre is a former U.S. attorney who has sued the county twice in the past decade about redistricting, and who ran unsuccessfully to be county district attorney.

Aguirre said the county should be spending its taxpayer money to thin the overgrown portions of the county's backcountry.

"What I'm saying to you is that the way in which you're spending money, transferring money, is not enough. You need to be doing more, and focus on the 954,357 acres of land that is still vulnerable in our community," Aguirre said. "I'm not criticizing you for what you did in the past, that will remain for the courts and others to decide."

Aguirre's statements drew angry responses from Supervisors Dianne Jacob and Ron Roberts.

Jacob said Aguirre should be "ashamed" for suggesting the \$3 million transfer be spent on anything other than helping the people whose homes were destroyed.

Roberts said Aguirre's comments marked the beginning of the political campaign season.

"I don't think we ought to allow anyone to come in here and try to take over the agenda and the important issues before this board for their own narrow political reasons," Roberts said, "whether it's Michael Aguirre or any other attorney who likes to go around suing people."

Jacob and fellow Supervisors Bill Horn and Pam Slater also defended the board's actions before last week's fires.

Among other things, board members said:

- They banned use of flammable, wooden, "shake shingle" roofs and wooden siding for new homes after fires in 1996.
- They traveled to Sacramento to fight the Legislature's decision this year to cut the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection's budget by \$50 million.

- After the 2002 Pines fire, which destroyed 61,000 acres, they created the Wildland Fires Task Force to find out what must be done to prevent future fires.

- Acting on the task force's findings, supervisors declared a county state of emergency in March over the bark beetle infestation that has killed many trees in the backcountry, and lobbied Davis to do the same to get federal funds to thin overgrown areas.

Jacob said Davis eventually declared a state of emergency in San Diego, San Bernardino and Riverside counties. Davis' request for \$430 million to help, however, was rejected by President Bush's administration, which gave the state \$43 million instead.

"Unfortunately, too little, too late," Jacob said.

Supervisors also said requests to create firebreaks or conduct controlled burns in backcountry areas have been opposed by environmental groups.

"Every environmentalist came out when I called for controlled burns to tell me we shouldn't do that," Horn said.

Following Aguirre's comments, supervisors unanimously voted to transfer the \$3 million and to adopt Roberts' suggestion to ask Schwarzenegger to convene an emergency session of the state Legislature to allow San Diego County to create a fire protection district.

The district would then be used to own and operate a fleet of five to six firefighting helicopters. Voters would have to approve a ballot measure to buy the helicopters, Roberts said.

The fire district would not be a countywide fire department, but its creation could lead to one being established.

Many officials have said they believed earlier intervention by firefighting air tankers and helicopters might have stopped the fires from doing so much damage, although others said high winds and smoke would have made early intervention impossible.

In other action, the board unanimously approved Jacob's recommendation to push Schwarzenegger for an independent investigation into the start of the fires.

Jacob said she believes that firefighters did all they could possibly do to control the fires, but may have been hindered by outdated "mutual aid" systems that sent San Diego County-based fire crews and equipment to fight fires in San Bernardino. She said she also wants answers to why the massive Cedar fire was not contained outside Ramona before Santa Ana winds turned it from a "small" fire to an inferno.

Jacob said Southern California fire agencies ---- which would be part of Davis' blue-ribbon investigating team ---- are not in a position to "police themselves."

Contact staff writer Gig Conaughton at (760) 739-6696 or gconaughton@nctimes.com.

Fire Perimeters
San Diego County
October 22, 2007
0130 Hrs

Legend

- | Fire Station | Address | Phone | Website |
|--------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Witch Fire (estimate) | 102207 | 0130hrs | |
| Harris Fire Perimeter | 102107 | 1600hrs | |
| Coronado Hills Perimeter | 0130hrs | | |
| New Fire! Perimeter Near San P | 0130hrs | | |
| Freeways | | | |
| Lakes | | | |

Data Source: SanGIS

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


Exhibit 9

11/15/03 LATIMES 1

Page 1

11/15/03 L.A. Times 1
2003 WLNR 15142771

Los Angeles Times
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November 15, 2003

Section: Main News

California
San Diego Fire Warnings Were Repeatedly Ignored
Tony Perry
Joel Rubin
Times Staff Writers
Times Staff Writers

SAN DIEGO County officials have repeatedly been warned that too few firefighters combined with dry back-country brush and Santa Ana winds could produce uncontrollable wildfires nearly identical to those that killed 16 people and destroyed 2,469 homes last month.

Despite the warnings, local leaders and voters both failed to implement recommendations that fire officials said would help fight a massive wildfire.

A review of San Diego city and county records shows that fire officials over the last two decades have predicted that firefighters could be helpless to stop even a small brush fire because the region did not have enough firefighters and water-dropping helicopters.

The warnings came in reports from the fire agencies seeking more funding and in task force studies after previous wildfires. Voters have rejected repeated proposals for funding improved fire protection with increased taxes.

On Thursday, in the wake of the Cedar fire, Mayor Dick Murphy announced the formation of another commission to examine how to improve firefighting.

The task force will consider brush clearing, better communication and gear, more firefighters and better coordination with other departments -- the same issues that another task force examined after a 1985 blaze.

The Cedar and Paradise fires started in the kind of terrain where officials had warned that such disasters might begin. The blazes spread in the manner officials

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had predicted, exposing weaknesses long noted in the fire protection system.

"Those fires were both predicted and predictable," said county Supervisor Dianne Jacob, who has long pushed for improved fire services.

San Diego city fire officials were so concerned last year about the vulnerability of Scripps Ranch that they asked Bill Clayton, a division chief with the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, for a study on how to defend the neighborhood from the flames.

Clayton produced a computer model of a blaze and foresaw with eerie accuracy the path that the Cedar fire, which destroyed more than 345 homes in Scripps Ranch, would take.

The Clayton report predicted that flames would race over hilly slopes, ignite the neighborhood's stately eucalyptus trees and destroy 250 to 300 homes before they could be contained.

That report was only the latest prediction of disaster.

In 1982, for example, then-Fire Chief Earle Roberts warned the City Council that San Diego was playing "Russian roulette" by not providing more resources to protect Scripps Ranch from a wildfire that would start in remote rural areas and race southward.

He predicted the time the city would be most vulnerable: on the weekends when staffing levels were at their lowest in the San Diego Fire Department. The Cedar fire erupted on a Saturday afternoon and was destroying homes in Scripps Ranch and Tierrasanta by midday Sunday.

In 1984, Roberts, who had been hired from Phoenix to improve the San Diego Fire Department, abruptly resigned. He complained that his recommendations had been ignored by city officials and that he had been unable to get the attention of his boss, then-City Manager Ray Blair.

Roberts said the city had too few firefighters, an inadequate number of fire engines and a system that relied on overtime to keep fire stations fully staffed.

Many of the problems that he and others cited persist today.

Although several new fire stations have been built, including one in Scripps Ranch, the Fire Department still has one of the lowest ratios of firefighters to population of any major city in the country. In outlying areas, San Diego County relies on a patchwork of more than 60 fire agencies, some staffed by volunteers.

Twenty-one of 32 ballot measures to increase taxes to improve fire protection in the county since 1996 have failed -- several in areas devastated by the recent fires.

After a 1982 fire destroyed 500 apartments in Anaheim, San Diego's fire marshal at the time repeatedly told both officials and the media that his city could face a similar disaster.

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The marshal, Charles Van Rickley, noted that attempts to upgrade fire codes and boost resources tend to falter as memories of the devastation wrought quickly fade.

"If you can get a regulation into the city the day after a disaster, fine," he told reporters. "But our experience is that, after 30 days, everybody has pretty well forgotten about it."

Within months of Van Rickley's warning, rural voters rejected two fire protection measures.

Three years later, several prominent businessmen and public officials formed the San Diego Regional Fire and Emergency Services Foundation to spread the word that the county was teetering on the edge of fire disaster. Having failed to change public opinion, the foundation disbanded in 1993 and gave the funds it had raised to a community group for dispersal to charities.

"It was so frustrating, because of an absolute lack of public interest in fire protection," said a foundation member, John A. Andersen, who was then police chief at UC San Diego. "Without a major incident to get people excited, nobody cared."

In 1996, after years of warnings about the fire threat in their isolated, brushy neighborhood, residents of Harbison Canyon, east of San Diego, were asked to approve a tax increase to improve resources. Voters overwhelmingly rejected the measure.

The Cedar fire destroyed 283 homes in Harbison Canyon -- roughly half of the community.

Harbison Canyon fire protection "historically has been shortchanged," said retired Chief Richard Durrell, who backed the 1996 measure. "This fire has got to change some attitudes."

In addition to warnings about the potential for a major fire, city and county officials have also received recommendations from commissions examining other wildfires that have hit in the last 20 years.

But relatively few of those recommendations have been carried out.

After the 1982 Anaheim fire, several San Diego City Council members suggested, in effect, banning shake-shingle roofs in the city.

Officials had long warned that such roofs can explode at the slightest exposure to wind-blown embers. Although some changes were made in codes involving roofs, shake-shingles were not banned.

Mayor Murphy said he hoped that one recommendation of the new task force would involve banning combustible roofs. But, he noted, "I haven't talked to the council yet" to see if a majority agrees.

A city task force formed after the 1985 Normal Heights fire, which damaged or destroyed 123 homes, recommended increased brush clearing, better communication gear, more firefighters and better coordination between the city and the state

forestry department to ensure that aerial tankers were quickly available.

Changes were made in city procedures to ensure quicker responses to canyon fires, and city water mains were upgraded. But coordination with the forestry department continued to be problematic.

That report wasn't the only one to stress the need for more firefighting aircraft. In his report last year about fire danger in Scripps Ranch, the forestry department's Clayton said that "it is imperative, under these conditions, that a very strong and aggressive air and ground attack take place at the point of origin."

Despite this warning, the city allowed a four-month lease on a firefighting helicopter to lapse just days before the Cedar fire began. Since the blaze, the city has renewed the lease on a month-to-month basis.

After a fire last year in the Julian-Ranchita area burned 60,000 acres and destroyed 35 homes, the county Board of Supervisors formed a task force to look at ways to avoid a similar disaster.

The report, finished just weeks before the Cedar and Paradise fires, warned that, because of tall and brittle brush, 80% of the wild-land areas in the county would "burn explosively under typical periods of high fire danger."

The task force offered ideas that have long circulated, including stronger efforts to persuade property owners to clear brush and a plan for controlled burns. So far, the recommendations have yet to be considered.

"We've been given a second chance," community activist and attorney **Michael Aguirre** told the San Diego City Council last week as it reviewed the latest fires. "Let's not blow it."

---- INDEX REFERENCES ----

COMPANY: CEDARCRESTONE INC

NEWS SUBJECT: (Local Government (1LO75); Government (1GO80))

INDUSTRY: (Science & Engineering (1SC33); Oceanography (1OC88); Forestry (1FO87); Natural Resources (1NA60); Earth Science (1EA85); Science (1SC89))

REGION: (USA (1US73); Americas (1AM92); North America (1NO39); California (1CA98))

Language: EN

OTHER INDEXING: (CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY; CEDAR; EMERGENCY SERVICES FOUNDATION; FIRE DEPARTMENT; PARADISE; SCRIPPS RANCH) (Bill Clayton; Charles Van Rickley; Clayton; County; Dick Murphy; John A. Andersen; Michael Aguirre; Murphy; Ray Blair; Richard Durrell; Rickley; Roberts; Supervisor Dianne Jacob; Twenty)

KEYWORDS: SAN DIEGO COUNTY; FIRE SAFETY; EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

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